We address the common problem of calculating intervals in the presence of systematic uncertainties. We aim to investigate several approaches, but here describe just a Bayesian technique for setting upper limits. The particular example we study is that of inferring the rate of a Poisson process when there are uncertainties on the acceptance and the background. Limit calculating software associated with this work is available in the form of C functions.
1 There are other possibilities. Thus it may be that all that is known is that a nuisance parameter is contained within a certain range: µ l ≤ µ ≤ µ u ; that is not enough information for a Bayesian approach. Alternatively the data relevant for the physics and nuisance parameters could be bound up in the main measurement, and not require a subsidiary one.
larly relevant for Particle Physics is the extraction of an upper limit on the rate of some hypothesized process or on a physical parameter, again with systematic uncertainties.
To specify the problem in more detail, we assume that we are performing a counting experiment in which we observe n counts, and that the acceptance has been estimated as ǫ 0 ± σ ǫ and the background as b 0 ± σ b . For a signal rate s, n is Poisson distributed with mean sǫ + b. Here ǫ contains factors like the intensity of the accelerator beam(s), the running time, and various efficiencies. It is constrained to be non-negative, but can be larger than unity.
We aim to study and compare different approaches for determining confidence intervals for this problem. In general we are interested in pathologies in these areas:
• Coverage. This is a measure of how often the limits that we deduce would in fact include the true value of the parameter. This requires consideration of an ensemble of experiments like the one we actually performed, and hence is an essentially frequentist concept. Nevertheless, it can be applied to a Bayesian technique.
Coverage is a property of the technique, and not of the particular limit deduced from a given measurement. It can, however, be a function of the true value of the parameter, which is in general unknown in a real measurement.
Undercoverage (i.e. the probability of containing the true value is less than the stated confidence level) is regarded by frequentists as a serious defect. Usually coverage is required for all possible values of the physical parameter. 2 In contrast, overcoverage is permissible, but the larger intervals result in less stringent tests of models that predict the value of the parameter. For measurements involving quantised data (e.g. Poisson counting), most methods have coverage which varies with the true value of the parameter of interest, and hence if undercoverage is to be avoided, overcoverage is inevitable.
Frequentist methods by construction will not undercover for any values of the parameters. This is not guaranteed for other approaches. For example, even though the Bayesian intervals shown here do not undercover, in other problems Bayesian 95% credible intervals could even have zero coverage for some values of the parameter of interest. [2] It should also be remarked that, although coverage is a very important property for frequentists, on its own exact coverage does not guarantee that intervals have desirable properties (for many examples, see Refs. [3] and [4] ).
• Interval length. This is sometimes used as a criterion of accuracy of intervals, in the sense that shorter intervals have less probability of covering false values of the parameter of interest. However, one should keep in mind that short intervals are only desirable if they contain the true value of the parameter. Thus empty intervals, which do occur in some frequentist constructions, are generally undesirable, even when their construction formally enjoys frequentist coverage.
Intervals that fill the entire physically allowed range of the parameter of interest may also occur in some situations. Examples of this behavior are given in [3] and [5] . An experimenter who requests a 68% confidence interval, but receives what appears to be a 100% confidence interval instead, may not be satisfied with the explanation that he is performing a useful service in helping to keep the coverage probability-averaged over his measurement and his competitor's measurements-from dropping below 68%.
• Bayesian credibility. In some situations it may be relevant to calculate the Bayesian credibility of an interval, even when the latter was constructed by frequentist methods. This would of course require one to choose a prior for all the unknown parameters. The question is one of plausibility: given the type of measurement we are making, the resolution of the apparatus, etc., how likely is it that the true value of the parameter we are interested in lies in the calculated interval? Does this differ dramatically from the nominal coverage probability of the interval? In fact for different values of the observable(s), frequentist ranges are very likely to have different credibilities. Some examples of this behavior are noted in Ref. [6] .
When calculating the Bayesian credibility of frequentist intervals, "uninformative" priors appear advisable. Note that severe interval length pathologies will automatically produce a large inconsistency between the nominal coverage and the Bayesian credibility of an interval. Except in a handful of very special cases, it is not possible to construct an interval scheme that has simultaneously constant Bayesian credibility and constant frequentist coverage, even if one has total freedom in choosing the prior(s). Although it is not at all clear exactly how large a level of disagreement is pathological, nevertheless it may be instructive to know how severely an interval scheme deviates from constant Bayesian credibility (and how sensitive this is to the choice of prior).
• Bias. • Transformation under reparametrisation.
Intervals that are not transformation-respecting can be problematic. For example, it is possible for the predicted value of the lifetime of a particle to be contained within the 90% interval determined from the data, but for the corresponding predicted value of the decay rate (equal to the reciprocal of the predicted lifetime) to be outside the 90% interval when the data is analysed by the same procedure, but in terms of decay rate. This would result in unwanted ambiguities about the compatibility of the data with the prediction.
• Unphysical ranges. The question here is whether the interval construction procedure can be made to respect the physical boundaries of the problem. For example, branching fractions should be in the range zero to one, masses should not be negative, etc. Statements about the true value of a parameter should respect any physical bounds. In contrast, some methods give estimates of parameters which can themselves be unphysical, or which include unphysical values when the errors are taken into account. We do not recommend truncating ranges of estimates of parameters to obey such bounds. Thus the fact that a branching fraction is estimated as 1.1±0.2 conveys more information about the experimental result than does the statement that it lies in the range 0.9 to 1.
• Behavior with respect to nuisance parameter. We would normally expect that the limits on a physical parameter would tighten as the uncertainty on a nuisance parameter decreases; and that as this uncertainty tends to zero, the limits should agree with those obtained under the assumption that the "nuisance parameter" was exactly known. (Otherwise we could sometimes obtain a tighter limit simply by pretending that we knew less about the nuisance parameter than in fact is the case.) These desiderata are not always satisfied by non-Bayesian methods (see [7] and [8] ).
Although we are ultimately interested in comparing different approaches to this problem, in this note we investigate a Bayesian technique for determining upper limits. Our purpose is to spell out in some detail how this approach is used, and to discuss some of the properties of the resulting limits in this specific example. We believe that, for variants of this problem (e.g. different choice of prior for s; alternative assumptions about the information on the nuisance parameters; etc.), the reader could readily adapt the techniques described here (and the associated software) to their particular situation.
We will report on two-sided intervals and also compare with other methods (e.g. Cousins-Highland, pure frequentist, profiled frequentist) in later notes.
Reminder of Bayesian approach
Before dealing with the problem of extracting and studying the limits on s as deduced from observing n events from a Poisson distribution with mean sǫ + b in the presence of an uncertainty on ǫ, we recall the way the Bayesian approach works for the simpler problem of a counting experiment with no background and with ǫ exactly known. Then n is Poisson distributed with mean sǫ, and Bayes' Theorem
gives
where π(s) is the prior probability density for s; p(s|n) is the posterior probability density function (p.d.f.) for s, given the observed n; and P (n|s) is the probability of observing n, given s. We assume a constant prior for s, 4 and that P (n|s) is given by the Poisson
The limit is now obtained by integrating this posterior p.d.f. for s until we achieve the required fraction β of the total integral from zero to infinity. If β is 90%, the upper limit s u is given by
β is termed the credible or Bayesian confidence level for the limit. For different observed n, the upper limits are shown in the last two columns of Table 1 , for b = 0 and for b = 3 respectively. The Gaussian approximation for the case b = 0, n = 20, would yield s u ≃ 20 + 1.28 √ 20 ≃ 25.7, which is roughly comparable to the corresponding s u = 27.0451 of the Table. For b = 0, it coincidentally turns out that, for this particular example, the Bayesian upper limits are identical with those obtained in a frequentist calculation with the Neyman construction and a simple ordering rule (see later note on the frequentist approach to this problem). In general this is not so. Other priors sometimes used for s are 1/ √ s [9] or 1/s [10] . Having a prior peaked at smaller values of s in general results in tighter limits for a given observed n.
If the whole procedure is now repeated with a background b and a flat prior, the upper limits not surprisingly decrease for increasing b at fixed n (except for the case n = 0 where the limits can trivially be seen to be independent of b). This is not inconsistent with the fact that the mean limit for a series of measurements increases with b, i.e. experiments with larger expected backgrounds have poorer sensitivity. Table 1 : Upper 90% limits for n observed events with b background and ǫ = 1.0 ± 0.1 (κ = 100 and m = 99, as defined in section 3.2). Also shown are limits for b = 0 and b = 3 with fixed ǫ = 1.
Coverage
Next we can investigate the frequentist coverage C(s true ) 6 of this Bayesian approach. That is, we can ask what the probability is, for a given value of s true , of our upper limit being larger than s true , and hence being consistent with it. This is equivalent to adding up the Poisson probabilities of eqn. (3) for those values of n for which s u (n) ≥ s true i.e.
C(s
As s true increases through any of the values of s u of the last two columns of Table 1 , the coverage drops sharply. For example, for the case of zero background and efficiency known to be unity, the 90% Bayesian upper limits will include s true = 3.8896 for n = 1 or larger. But s true = 3.8898 is no longer below the upper limit for n = 1. Thus one term drops out of the summation of eqn. (6) for the calculation of the coverage at s true = 3.8898, while the remaining terms change but little for the small change in s true ; this produces the abrupt fall in coverage. The coverage is plotted in Fig. 1 , where the drop at s true = 3.8897 can be seen.
The calculation of C(s true ) can be done as follows: The identity
allows us to write (integrating −f
From this, it follows that "relevant n" is equivalent to any one of these inequalities:
and our expression for the coverage becomes
where ′ means "sum until the next term would cause the sum to exceed 1 − β". This result proves that C(s true ) ≥ β for all values of s true in this simple example.
It is seen that the coverage starts at 100% for small s true . This is because even for n = 0 the Bayesian upper limit will include s true , and this is even more so for larger n.
Bayesian methods can be shown to achieve average coverage. By this we mean that when the coverage is averaged over the parameter s, weighted by the prior in s, the result will agree with the nominal value β, i.e.
A proof of this theorem is given in the second appendix, section 7 of this note. For a constant prior, the region at large s tends to dominate the average, while in general we will be interested in the coverage at small s. Thus the "average coverage" result is of academic rather than practical interest, especially for the case of a flat prior. Indeed it is possible to have a situation where the average coverage is, say, 90%, while the coverage as a function of s is always larger than or equal to 90%.
The actual problem
Our actual problem differs from the simple case of Section 2 in that (a) we have a background b, assumed for the time being to be accurately known; and (b) we have an acceptance ǫ estimated in a subsidiary experiment as ǫ 0 ± σ ǫ .
What we are going to do is to use a multidimensional version of Bayes' Theorem to express p(s, ǫ|n) in terms of P (n|s, ǫ) and the priors for s and ǫ. The relationship is
7 For the case where the probabilities have a frequency ratio interpretation, this is seen from the mathematical identities 
So with X, Y and Z identified with s, ǫ and n respectively, and with the prior for s and ǫ factorising into two separate priors for s and for ǫ, we obtain p(s, ǫ|n) P (n) = P (n|s, ǫ) π(s) π(ǫ).
To obtain the posterior p.d.f. for s, we now integrate this over ǫ:
and finally we use this to set a limit on s as in eqn. (5) . The coverage for this procedure needs to be calculated as a function of s true and ǫ true . The average coverage theorem of the previous section must be generalized to
Priors
To implement the above procedure we need priors for s and ǫ. As in the simple example of Section 2, for simplicity we assume that the prior for s is constant. It will be interesting to look at the way the properties of this method change as other priors for s are used. We assume that the prior for ǫ is extracted from some subsidiary measurement ǫ 0 ± σ ǫ . We do not assume that this implies that our belief about ǫ true is represented by a Gaussian distribution centred on ǫ 0 , as this would give trouble with the lower end of the Gaussian extending to negative ǫ. Instead, we specify some particular form of the subsidiary experiment that provides information about ǫ, and then assume that a Bayesian analysis of this yields a posterior p.d.f. for ǫ. Slightly confusingly, this posterior from the subsidiary experiment is used as the prior for the application of Bayes' Theorem to extract the limit on s (see eqns. (12) and (13)).
The subsidiary measurement
Somewhat arbitrarily, we assume that, for a true acceptance ǫ true , the probability for the measured value ǫ 0 in the subsidiary experiment is given by a Poisson distribution
where ǫ 0 = (m + 1)/κ, σ 2 ǫ = (m + 1)/κ 2 and κ is a scaling constant 8 . We interpret this as the probability for ǫ 0 . This is discrete because the observable m is discrete, but the allowed values become closely spaced for large κ. For small σ ǫ /ǫ (i.e. for large m), these probabilities approximate to a narrow Gaussian (see Fig. 2 ).
Given our choice of probability in eqn. (15), the likelihood for the parameter ǫ,
This is the same function of ǫ and ǫ 0 as eqn. (15), but now m is regarded as fixed, and ǫ is the variable. The likelihood is a continuous function of ǫ. It is compared with a Gaussian in Fig. 3 . Finally in the Bayes approach, with the choice of a constant prior for ǫ, the posterior probability density for ǫ after our subsidiary measurement is
which is obtained by multiplying the right-hand side of eqn. (16) by unity. This posterior probability density for ǫ will be used as our prior for ǫ in the next step of deducing the limit for s.
Results
The details of the necessary analytical calculations 9 are presented in the Appendix of this note. In this section we investigate the behavior of the Bayesian limits in this example, especially the shape of the frequentist coverage probability as a function of s true .
Shape of the posterior
The posterior p.d.f. for s has the form
where the likelihood, the prior for ǫ, the (constant) prior for s, and the marginalization integral over ǫ are all prominently displayed. The posterior probability density for s gives the complete summary of the outcome of the measurement in the Bayesian approach. It is therefore important to understand its shape before proceeding to use it to compute a limit (or extract a central value and error-bars). Figure 4 illustrates the shape of the posterior for s (i.e. marginalized over ǫ) in the case of a nominal 10% uncertainty on ǫ, and an expectation of 3 background events. Plots are shown for 1, 3, 5, and 10 observed events. The posterior evolves gracefully from being strongly peaked at s = 0 to a roughly Gaussian shape that excludes the neighborhood near s = 0 with high probability. Technically, the posterior would be described as a mixture of n + 1 Beta distributions of the 2nd kind 10 , giving it a tail at high s that is heavier than that of a Gaussian.
Upper limits
In this note, our main goal is to obtain a Bayesian upper limit s u from our observation of n events. It is by integrating the posterior p.d.f. out to s = s u that an upper limit is calculated: a β = 90% upper limit is defined so that the integral of the posterior from 9 This example can be handled analytically. More complicated cases might require numerical integration, which can be done via numerical quadrature or Monte Carlo methods. 10 The 2nd Beta distribution is also known as "Beta ′ " (i.e. "Beta prime"), "inverted Beta", "Pearson Type VI", "Variance-Ratio", "Gamma-Gamma", "F", "Snedecor", "Fisher-Snedecor". . . . Table 1 One notices that when n = 0, the limit is independent of the expected background b. This is required in the Bayesian approach: we know that exactly zero background events were produced (when no events at all were produced), and this knowledge of what did happen makes what might have happened superfluous. An interesting corollary is, in the case of no events observed, uncertainties in estimating the background rate are of no consequence in the Bayesian approach, and must not contribute any systematic uncertainty to the limit. This reasoning does not hold in the frequentist framework, where what might have happened definitely does influence the limit.
For comparison, limits for fixed ǫ = 1 with b = 0 or b = 3 are also shown in Table 1 . It is interesting that these two columns start out equal at n = 0 and differ by almost exactly 3 for n > 11. In contrast, the difference between the b = 0 and b = 3 columns for ǫ = 1.0 ± 0.1 is already greater than 3 at n = 6, and continues to grow as n increases; it is not clear whether the difference approaches a finite value as n → ∞. In any case, the limits for ǫ = 1 exactly are all smaller than the corresponding limits for ǫ = 1.0 ± 0.1, as expected.
Coverage
The main quantity of interest in this subsection is the frequentist coverage probability C as a function of s true (for fixed ǫ true and b). Because both the main and the subsidiary measurements involve observing a discrete number of events, the function C(s true ) will have many discontinuities. On the other hand, C(ǫ true ) will be continuous (for fixed s true ). The explanation of this effect is as follows:
The measured data are n events in the main measurement and m events in the subsidiary measurement. For each observed outcome (n, m) there is a limit s u (n, m). This limit includes the effect of marginalization over ǫ.
All (n, m) with n ≥ 0 and m ≥ 0 are possible, and the probability P of observing (n, m) can be calculated as the product of two Poissons. (It will depend on s true , ǫ true , . . . ) If we look at all the possible limits we can obtain, {s u (n, m)|n ≥ 0 and m ≥ 0}
and sort them in increasing s u , the s u are countably infinite in number and dense in the same way that rational numbers are dense in the reals. To compute the coverage as a function of s true , we simply add up all the probabilities of obtaining (n, m) with s u (n, m) ≥ s true : This sum is over a countably infinite number of terms. If we increase s true slightly to s true + ds and recalculate the coverage, we have to drop all the terms
from the previous sum (the P (n, m) for each term also changes continuously with s true , but this is no problem But it seems that, in general, we can always find a solution to s true ≤ s u (n, m) ≤ s true + ds for finite ds by going out to larger and larger n and m. So, although the discontinuity may be tiny, we can always find a finite discontinuity in any finite interval of s true .
On the other hand, if we keep s true fixed and vary ǫ true , we always sum over the same set of (n, m), since the definition of A does not involve ǫ true , and P (n, m) is continuous in ǫ true . So the coverage is continuous as a function of ǫ true for s true fixed.
Plotting a curve that is discontinuous at every point is somewhat problematical. The solution adopted here is to plot the coverage as straight line segments between the discontinuities, ignoring any discontinuities with |∆C| < 10 −4 . Figure 5 shows C(s true ) for the case β = 90%, ǫ true = 1, nominal 10% uncertainty of the subsidiary measurement of ǫ, and b = 3. We observe that C(s true ) > β in this range, and it is not clear numerically whether C(s true ) → β as s true → ∞. The same conclusions hold for Fig. 6 , which illustrates the same situation with a 20% nominal uncertainty for the ǫ-measurement. Figure 7 shows C(ǫ true ) for β = 90%, s true = 10, κ = 100, and b = 3-continuous as advertised. The shape of the curve is quite similar to that of Figs. 5 and 6, so it seems that the coverage probability (with b fixed) is approximately a function of just the product of ǫ true and s true . This approximate rule is likely to fail in the limit as ǫ true → 0 and s true → ∞, for example, but it seems to hold when ǫ true and s true are at least of the same order of magnitude.
When ǫ true s true is small, of order 1 or less, the coverage is ∼100%, as in the simple case of Fig. 1 . Otherwise, the behavior of coverage in Figs. 5-7 is superior to that of Fig. 1 , which has a much larger amplitude of oscillation.
Another frequentist quantity that characterizes the performance of a limit scheme is the sensitivity, defined as the mean of s u . Figure 8 shows the sensitivity as a function of s true for the case of Fig. 5 ; s u is observed to be nearly linearly dependent on s true . There is one complication here: when the subsidiary measurement observes m = 0 events, and the prior for s is flat, s u = ∞. Since the Poisson probability of obtaining m = 0 is always finite, s u is consequently infinite. So we must exclude the m = 0 case from the definition of s u . (In Fig. 8 the probability of obtaining m = 0 is e −100 ≃ 4 × 10 −44 .)
Other priors for s
A weakness of the Bayesian approach is that there is no universally accepted method to obtain a unique "non-informative" or "objective" prior p.d.f. Reference [9] , for example, states:
Put bluntly: data cannot ever speak entirely for themselves; every prior specification has some informative posterior or predictive implications; and "vague" is itself much too vague an idea to be useful. There is no "objective" prior that represents ignorance.
Nevertheless, Ref. [9] does derive a 1/ √ s "reference prior" for the simple Poisson case, which is claimed to have "a minimal effect, relative to the data, on the final inference". This is to be considered a "default option when there are insufficient resources for detailed elicitation of actual prior knowledge". Reference [10] attempts to discover the optimal form for prior ignorance by considering the behavior of the prior under reparameterizations. For the case in question, the form 1/s clearly has the best properties in this respect.
We are using an flat (s 0 ) prior for this study, which seems to be the most popular choice, but the Appendix works out the form of the posterior using an s α−1 prior, so we can briefly here summarize the results for the 1/s and 1/ √ s cases: The 1/s prior leads to an unnormalizable posterior for all observed n when b > 0. The posterior becomes a δ-function at s = 0, s u = 0 for any β, and the coverage is consequently zero for all s true > 0. This clearly is a disaster.
The 1/ √ s prior results in a posterior p.d.f. qualitatively similar in shape to those of Fig 4, except that the p.d. f. is always infinite at s = 0. For n ≫ b, this produces an extremely thin "spike" at s = 0, which has a negligible contribution to the integral of the posterior p.d.f. A more significant difference (for frequentists) between the 1/ √ s and the s 0 case is that the coverage probability is significantly reduced: for the case of Fig. 5 It should be noted that all the prior p.d.f.'s considered in this note are "improper priors"-they cannot be correctly normalized: In the case of the s 0 and 1/ √ s priors, the integral from 0 to any value s 0 is finite, while the integral from s 0 to infinity is infinite. The corresponding integrals of the 1/s prior are infinite on both sides for all s 0 > 0. Improper priors are dangerous but often useful; "improper posteriors" are generally pathological. Extra care must be taken when employing improper priors to verify the normalizability of the resulting posterior-when using a numerical method to obtain the posterior, it is very easy to miss the fact that its integral is infinite.
Restrictions
We summarize here the restrictions forced on the priors for s and ǫ-see the Appendix for the analytical causes. The discussion below assumes b > 0. The prior for s being of the form s α−1 , we must require α > 0, as discussed above. As specified in this note, the prior for ǫ, being taken from the posterior from the subsidiary measurement with a flat prior, has been given no freedom. Should the subsidiary measurement observe m = 0 events, the posterior for s is not normalizable when α ≥ 1: s u = ∞ when m = 0 and α ≥ 1.
This behavior is due to a well known effect: the ǫ prior becomes κe −κǫ when m = 0, which remains finite as ǫ → 0. All such cases 11 yield s u = ∞ when α ≥ 1; any positive α < 1 cuts off the posterior at large s sufficiently rapidly to render it normalizable. From this point of view, a 1/ √ s prior may seem preferable, but on the other hand, having s u = ∞ when m = 0 seems intuitively reasonable. (In general, we have s u = ∞ for m ≤ α − 1, but α ≥ 2 are not popular choices.) There is another approach possible to the gamma prior for ǫ: we may simply specify by fiat the form of the prior as
where µ is no longer required to be an integer. In practice, one then might obtain µ and κ from a subsidiary measurement whose result is approximated by the gamma distribution. In such cases, one must require µ > α to keep the posterior normalizable. Note that in this form, µ/κ is the mean of the ǫ prior, (µ − 1)/κ is the mode, and µ/κ 2 is the variance. The subsidiary measurement is often analysed by other experimenters, who chose statistics to quote for their central value and uncertainty (omitting additional likelihood information). It is then important to obtain µ and κ in a consistent way from the information supplied by the subsidiary measurement. If ǫ, for example, were estimated by a maximum likelihood method, one would identify the estimate with (µ − 1)/κ rather than µ/κ.
Conclusions
Results have been presented on the performance of a purely Bayesian approach to the issue of setting upper limits on the rate of a process, when n events have been observed in a situation where the expected background is b and where the efficiency/acceptance factor ǫ ± σ ǫ has been determined in a subsidiary experiment. We find that this approach, when using a flat prior for the rate, results in modest overcoverage. Plots of the expected sensitivity of such a measurement and of the coverage of the upper limits are given. It will be interesting to compare these with the corresponding plots for other methods of extracting upper limits, to be given in future notes. Reference [11] provides the limit calculating software associated with this study in the form of C functions.
Appendix A-Analytical Details
Here we present the details of the analytical calculation of the posterior p.d.f. for s.
For generality, we work through the calculation with a s α−1 prior; a flat prior is then the special case α = 1.
Posterior for s with ǫ and b fixed
We measure n events from a process with Poisson rate ǫs+b, and we want the Bayesian posterior for s, given improper prior s α−1 . We compute the posterior for fixed ǫ and b in this subsection; the calculation with our prior for ǫ follows in the next subsection. We have posterior:
where all factors not depending on s have already been absorbed into the normalization constant N s , which is defined by
where we have performed the indicated change of variable. Expanding (1 + u) n in powers of u using the binomial theorem, we get
Recognizing this as of the general hypergeometric form, we write it as
to make the hypergeometric nature more explicit. Using the modern notation [12] for the falling factorial
this is expressed as
where M is the notation of [13] . (M, a confluent hypergeometric function, is often written 1 F 1 , and the relation given here is only valid for integer n ≥ 0.) Note that M(−n, 1 − n − α, b) is a polynomial of order n in b (for n a non-negative integer), and is related to the Laguerre polynomials. When α = 1, we get M(−n, −n, b), which is related to the Incomplete Gamma Function. When α = 0, we get M(−n, 1 − n, b), which is infinite, so we require that α > 0. Our posterior probability density for fixed ǫ is then given by
Posterior for ǫ of the subsidiary measurement
The subsidiary measurement observes an integer number of events m, Poisson distributed as:
where κ is a real number (connecting the subsidiary measurement to the main measurement) whose uncertainty is negligible, so κ can safely be treated as a fixed constant. κ might be thought of, for example, as based on a cross section that is exactly calculable by theory. There is negligible (i.e. zero) background in the subsidiary measurement. The prior for ǫ is specified to be flat. The Bayesian posterior p.d.f. for ǫ is then
(or Γ(m+1) instead of m! in the denominator if you prefer). This is known as a gamma distribution.
The mean and rms of this posterior p.d.f. summarize the result of the subsidiary measurement as:
Note that the observed data quantity in the subsidiary measurement is an integer m, while the quantity being measured by the subsidiary measurement is a positive real number ǫ.
Posterior for s with gamma prior for ǫ (b fixed)
Next we compute the joint posterior p(s, ǫ|b, n)dsdǫ using the s α−1 prior for s and our gamma distribution prior (i.e. the posterior derived from the subsidiary measurement) for ǫ ≥ 0 prior for ǫ:
where it is convenient to write µ for m + 1. We have for the joint posterior p.d.f.
We calculated N s above, so we have
The marginalized posterior for s can then be expressed as
where the integral I ǫ is given by
The same procedure that was used for the normalization integral can be applied here, producing
which has a particularly simple form when the background term is zero:
a Beta distribution of the 2nd kind. Note that we must require µ > α > 0 to obtain a normalizable posterior.
Our posterior p.d.f. for s with ǫ (and b) fixed is recovered exactly by taking the limit of p(s|b, n) as σ ǫ → 0. This means that the limit of s u as σ ǫ → 0 is identical to the value of s u when ǫ is known exactly. This property may seem obvious, but it is violated by some frequentist methods of setting limits, so it is worth mentioning.
Calculating the limit
We need to integrate p(s|b, n) up to some limit s u , which can be done analytically as follows.
where the substitution t = s s+κ has been performed. Re-expanding the polynomial M and integrating term by term yields
where I x is the standard notation for the Incomplete Beta Function
which also satisfies the following recursion:
Integer moments of the marginalized posterior
Using the same technique as above, we can calculate the jth moment of the posterior p.d.f. as
where we utilize the rising factorial notation [12] 
The expression for the mean of the posterior when α = 1 can be simplified using the identity
Note that the 2nd term is very small when n ≫ b. The recurrence relation [13] r(r − 1)M(q, r − 1, z) + r(1 − r − z)M(q, r, z) + z(r − q)M(q, r + 1, z) = 0 leads to a recurrence relation between moments
The special case α = 1 then yields
which leads to this approximation for the variance of the posterior
6.6 Posterior for s with gamma priors for ǫ and b
Here we very briefly consider the case where the background parameter b also acquires an uncertainty. This case is more general than the fixed b case that is the main subject of this note: the fixed b case will be the subject of additional studies employing various popular frequentist techniques, with the goal of comparing their performance. We judge the more general case considered in this subsection to be more complicated than necessary for the purpose of comparing the various methods, but it is instructive to document the fact that the Bayesian method can easily handle the more general case. We assume a 2nd subsidiary measurement observing r events (Poisson, as was the case for ǫ), which, when combined with a flat prior for b, results in a gamma posterior for b of the form
where ω is a calibration constant (analogous to κ in the subsidiary measurement for ǫ).
The posterior for b becomes the prior for b in the measurement of s. After determining the joint posterior p(s, ǫ, b|n) by using our priors for s, ǫ and b, we marginalize with respect to ǫ and b, resulting in
where we write ρ = r + 1 for convenience, and F is the hypergeometric function [14] . As long as n is a non-negative integer and α > 0, F (−n, ρ; 1 − n − α; x) is a polynomial of order n in x (closely related to Jacobi polynomials). This marginalized posterior for s can then be integrated, with the result
These two equations closely resemble the main results of sections 6.3 and 6.4: to recover the fixed b results, simply substitute bω for ρ above, and take the limit ω → ∞.
Appendix B-Average Coverage Theorem
In this appendix we prove that Bayesian credible intervals have average frequentist coverage, where the average is calculated with respect to the prior density. We start from the Bayesian posterior density:
For a given observed value of n, a credibility-β Bayesian interval for s is any interval [s L (n), s U (n)] that encloses a fraction β of the total area under the posterior density. Such an interval must therefore satisfy:
or, using the definition of the posterior density:
Now for coverage. Given a true value s t of s, the coverage C(s t ) of [s L (n), s U (n)] is the frequentist probability that s t is included in that interval. We can write this as:
C(s t ) = all n such that: s L (n)≤s≤s U (n) P (n | s t ). This completes the proof. We have assumed here that the prior π(s) is proper and normalized to 1, but the proof can be generalized to improper priors such as those we considered in this note. A constant prior for example, can be regarded as the limit for s max → ∞ of the proper prior:
where ϑ(x) is 0 if x < 0 and 1 otherwise. We then define the average coverage for the constant prior as the limit:
The previous proof can now be applied to the argument of the limit and leads to the same result. The average coverage theorem remains valid when s is multidimensional, for example when it consists of a parameter of interest and one or more nuisance parameters. In that case one needs to average the coverage over all the parameters. For reference, the sensitivity for σ ǫ = 0 is also given (dashed).
